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RICO LAW-WRONGFUL DISCHARGE AND RICO CONSPIRACY
STANDING: THE HOLMES V. SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION
CORP. DIRECT-INJURY TEST RESOLVES THE STANDING ISSUE
INTRODUCTION
Section 1962(a )-( c) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO")1 makes it a violation of federal law to
invest, maintain an interest, or participate in the affairs of an enter
prise through a pattern of racketeering activity.2 Section 1962(d) of
RICO also makes "[ilt ... unlawful for any person to conspire to
violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this
section."3 Finally, section 1964(c) of RICO provides treble dam
ages to any person "injured in his business or property by reason of
a violation of section 1962."4
In Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.,5 the United
States Supreme Court held that an injury occurs "by reason of' a
1. Title IX of the. Organized Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941
(1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. V 1993»
(adopted October 15, 1970).
2. 18 U.S.c. § 1962(a)-(c) (1988). These subsections state the following:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income de
rived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through
collection of an unlawful debt ... to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any
part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any
interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is en
gaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce ....
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering
activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, di
rectly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is en
gaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection
of unlawful debt.
Id.
3. 18 U.S.c. § 1962(d) (1988).
4. 18 U.S.c. § 1964(c) (1988) (emphasis added). The full text of this subsection
states: "Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of
section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district
court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, in
cluding a reasonable attorney's fee." Id.
5. 112 S. Ct. 1311 (1992).
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RICO violation only if the violation directly causes the injury.6
Wrongfully discharged employees have argued that their injuries
are directly caused by their former employers' conspiracies to vio
late RICO. They seek treble damages pursuant to section 1964(c)
in two situations. In one situation, the employee is discharged for
refusing to participate in the racketeering activity of an employer.7
In the other situation, the employee is discharged for "blowing the
whistle" on an employer's racketeering activity.8
The use of RICO's civil damages provision by wrongfully dis
charged employees, however, rests on the edge of RICO's "direct
injury" analysis. Is the wrongful discharge directly caused by the
conspiracy? Should a wrongfully discharged employee's RICO suit
survive a motion to dismiss? These questions have divided the
United States courts of appeals, and the United States Supreme
Court has not resolved the issue. This Note analyzes these ques
tions and discusses the effects of the Holmes decision on the stand
ing of wrongfully discharged employees.
Section I discusses the elements of a RICO conspiracy, the
type of injury which is compensable under section 1964(c), and the
pre-Holmes wrongful discharge cases. Section II takes a closer look
at the facts and analysis of Holmes, and examines the two post
Holmes wrongful discharge cases in the United States courts of ap
peals. These two cases, Schiffels v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc. 9
and Bowman v. Western Auto Supply CO.,l0 demonstrate some of
the effects of Holmes on wrongful discharge standing analysis.
Finally, Section III further analyzes wrongful discharge under
the direct-injury test. The direct-injury test demonstrates that the
claims of wrongfully injured employees should survive a motion to
dismiss when proper factual allegations are made. The validity of
their claims should depend on these factual allegations rather than
6. Id. at 1318. The Holmes Court reasoned that this approach follows the com
mon law principle that proximate cause "reflects 'ideas of what justice demands, or of
what is administratively possible and convenient.'" Id. (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 264 (5th ed. 1984».
7. See infra notes 60-96 and 146-68 and accompanying text for the factual settings
and analyses of the RICO civil actions brought by wrongfully discharged employees
which have reached the United States courts of appeals.
8. See supra note 7.
9. 978 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1992). For a full discussion of Schiffels, see infra notes
146-56 and accompanying text.
10. 985 F.2d 383 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2459 (1993). For a full discus
sion of Bowman, see infra notes 157-68 and accompanying text.
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on the legal hurdles which a majority of the United States courts of
appeals have erected.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

What Is a RICO Conspiracyll

In United States v. Elliott,12 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit faced a criminal scheme involving six defendants, thirty
seven un indicted co-conspirators, and over twenty different crimi
nal endeavors ranging from arson to murder to stealing meat and
shirts. Because traditional conspiracy law requires the proof of a
single agreement, the Elliott court noted that the commission of
highly diverse crimes by a large number of individuals rendered the
defendants' prosecution for conspiracy nearly impossible,13 In
RICO, however, the Elliott court found a new tool by which to infer
a single agreement among diverse activities: the RICO
"enterprise."14

,

11. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988). See supra text accompanying note 3 for the text
of the RICO conspiracy provision.
12. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
13. Id. at 902. Traditional conspiracy law utilizes two theories for conspiracy
prosecutions. First, the "wheel conspiracy" involves one person acting as the "hub" of a
wheel and conspiring with several others, the "spokes" of the wheel. The awareness by
the "spokes" of the other "spokes" serves to form a "rim" which encloses the "wheel."
Id. at 900 (citing United States v. Levine, 546 F.2d 658, 663 (5th Cir. 1977». Second,
the "chain conspiracy" involves a principal actor operating through a series of middle
men. The middlemen may not be aware of each other, but they understand that in
order for the conspiracy to be successful, there must be several "links" in the "chain" of
operation. Id. at 900-01 (citing Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539 (1947».
14. Id. at 902. '''[E]nterprise' includes any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in
fact although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988).
The Elliott court's use of the "enterprise" theory comports with the general philos
ophy of RICO:
It is the purpose of this act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the
United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering pro
cess, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanc
tions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in
organized crime.
S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969).
When the first two drafts of RICO were introduced in 1967, S. 2048 and S. 2049,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), Senator Hruska, the sponsor, defined organized crime as a
"tightly knit and strictly disciplined criminal cartel." 113 CONGo REC. 17998 (1967). As
the bill evolved, however, it became broader in scope. See Gerard E. Lynch, RICO:
The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & ll, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 661,666-73 (1987), for
a thorough discussion of RICO's evolution. See also United States V. Turkette, 452 U.S.
576, 586-87 (1981) (viewing Congress' language as self-consciously broad and
expansive).
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The Elliott court held "that, through RICO, Congress intended
to authorize the single prosecution of a multi-faceted, diversified
conspiracy."15 Under RICO's conspiracy provision, the Elliott
court reasoned, the prosecution of an individual could be achieved
if it could reasonably be inferred that the diverse crimes committed
were intended to further an enterprise's affairs. 16 This use of the
RICO "enterprise" concept by the Elliott court has "popularized
the notion of RICO as a super-conspiracy statute."17
The holding of Elliott, however, has led to some disagreement
among the United States courts of appeals. The Elliott court con
cluded that "[t]o be convicted as a member of an enterprise con
spiracy, an individual, by his words or actions, must have
objectively manifested an agreement to participate, directly or indi
rectly, in the affairs of an enterprise through the commission of two
or more predicate crimes. "18 A "predicate" crime or act under
RICO is one of the many offenses defined by Congress as "racke
teering activity."19 Two or more predicate acts must be committed
15. Elliott, 571 F.2d at 902.
16. Id. at 902·03.
17. Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts III & IV, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 920, 949 (1987).
See Turkette, 452 U.S. 576. In Turkette, the United States Supreme Court refused
to limit the definition of enterprise to legitimate enterprises. The Court, therefore, up
held the conviction of a group of individuals under the RICO conspiracy provision, 18
U.S.c. § 1962(d), who were associated for the exclusive purpose of committing illegal
activities. Despite noting that the major purpose of RICO was to prevent the infiltra
tion of legitimate business by organized crime, the Court held that "neither the lan
guage nor structure of RICO limits its application to legitimate 'enterprises.'" Id. at
587.
18. Elliott, 571 F.2d at 903.
19. 18 U.S.c. § 1961(1) (Supp. V 1993). Congress defines "racketeering activity"
as:
(A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery,
bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic or other
dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by im
prisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any
of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relat
ing to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and
473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate
shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (re
lating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (re
lating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1029 (relating to fraud and
related activity in connection with access devices), section 1084 (relating to
transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud),
section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1344 (relating to financial institu
tion fraud), sections 1461-1465 (relating to obscene matter), section 1503 (re
lating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of
criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or
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to constitute a substantive RICO violation, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c),
because these violations require· "a pattern of racketeering activ
ity."20 A RICO conspiracy, therefore, is an agreement to commit
two or more predicate acts within a single scheme.
The disagreement among the courts of appeals concerns
whether the individual must agree to personally commit two or
more predicate acts. In other words, the majority of the United
States courts of appeals hold that a RICO conspiracy is committed
when an individual merely agrees to the commission of a pattern of
racketeering activity in furtherance of the affairs of an enterprise. 21
The majority does not require that the individual agree to personlocal law enforcement), section 1512 (relating to tampering with a victim, wit
ness, or an informant), section 1513 (relating to retaliating against a victim,
witness, or an informant), section 1951 (relating to interference with com
merce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section
1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section
1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to
the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), section 1956 (relating to the
laundering of monetary instruments), section 1957 (relating to engaging in
monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity),
section 1958 (relating to use of interstate commerce facilities in the. commis
sion of murder-for-hire), sections 2251-2252 (relating to sexual exploitation of
children), sections 2312 and 2313 (relating to interstate transportation of sto
len motor vehicles), section 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transporta
tion of stolen property), section 2321 (relating to trafficking in certain motor
vehicles or motor vehicle parts), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in
contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-2424 [sic] (relating to white slave traffic),
(C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186
(dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or
section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), (D) any offense
involving fraud connected with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of securi
ties, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buy
ing, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs,
punishable under any law of the United States, or (E) any act which is indicta
ble under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act.
Id.

20.

See supra note 2 for the full text of RICO's substantive provisions, 18 U.S.C.

§ 1962(a)-(c) (1988). Congress defined "a pattern of racketeering activity" as "at least

two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this
chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years ... after the commission of a
prior act of racketeering activity." 18 U.S.c. § 1961(5) (1988).
In H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989), the United
States Supreme Court held that a pattern of racketeering activity does not require two
schemes, but instead, requires two predicate acts "within a single scheme that were
related and that amounted to, or threatened the likelihood of, continued criminal activ
ity." Id. at 237.
21. United States v. Pryba, 900 F.2d 748,759-60 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
924 (1990); United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 859 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Joseph, 781 F.2d 549, 554 (6th Cir. 1986); United.States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 939 (1986); United States v. Adams, 759 F.2d 1099, 1116 (3d
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ally commit those acts.22 A minority of the United States courts of
appeals, however, holds that a defendant may be convicted of a
RICO conspiracy only if the defendant personally agreed to commit
two or more predicate acts.23
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly denied certi
orari on this conflict, and Justice White dissented on numerous oc
casions. 24 Justice White argued that if the majority's position is .
correct, then "Congress' intent is being frustrated in those circuits
which adhere to the narrower view of RICO conspiracy;"25 if the
majority is incorrect, then the "defendants are being exposed to
conviction for behavior Congress did not intend to reach under
[section] 1962(d)."26
B.

Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.: The United States Supreme
Court's First Look at Section 1964(c)

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex CO.27 for two reasons. First, the Sedima Court
noted the importance of RICO civil litigation caused by its rapid
expansion in the early 1980s.28 Second, the Sedima Court wanted
to resolve a division among the United States courts of appeals conCir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 971 (1985); United States v. Carter, 721 F.2d 1514, 1529-31
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984).
22. See supra note 2l.
23. United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
831 (1984); United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1136 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1011 (1983).
24. Pryba v. United States, 498 U.S. 924 (White, J., dissenting), denying cert. to
900 F.2d 748 (4th Cir. 1990); Neopolitan v. United States, 479 U.S. 940 (White, J.,
dissenting), denying cert. to 791 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1986); Adams v. United States, 474
U.S. 971 (White, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 759 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir. 1985); Morris v.
United States, 469 U.S. 819, denying cert. to 721 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1984).
25. Adams, 474 U.S. at 973 (White, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 759 F.2d 1099.
26. Id. A recent law review article suggests that the Supreme Court resolve this
disagreement in the following manner:
On the basis of the absence of a provision directly requiring proof of personal
agreement and the express statement that RICO is to be liberally construed, it
appears that the correct approach is the one taken by the majority. This is
because it follows the language of the statute by not creating a requirement
that is not contained within the language of the statute. In addition, it further
effectuates the purpose of the Act by providing the government with a more
effective tool to deal with organized crime.
Jeanette Cotting, Note, RICO's Conspiracy Agreement Requirement: A Matter of Se
mantics?, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 725, 753-54 (1993).
27. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
28. Id. at 485-86 & nn.5-6. Prior to Sedima, district courts had rendered 270
RICO decisions. Of those, only three percent were decided in the 1970s, two percent in
1980, seven percent in 1981, 13% in 1982,33% in 1983, and 43% in 1984. Id. at 481 n.1
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cerning what type of injury could be caused "by reason of" a RICO
violation. 29 While the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re
quired a "racketeering injury,"30 the Courts of Appeals for the
Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits rejected such a limitation. 31
1.

The Background of Sedima

In 1979, Sedima agreed to enter into a joint venture with Imrex
to provide aircraft and aircraft electronic parts to a NATO sub con
tractor. 32 Sedima's role was to secure the orders and to import the
parts from Imrex who supplied the parts from the United States. 33
Sedima had secured $8.5 million worth of orders, and Imrex had
filled approximately eight million dollars worth of the orders, when
Sedima filed suit against Imrex. 34
Sedima alleged that Imrex had overstated purchase prices and
produced fraudulent billing charges. 35 The complaint alleged sev
eral common-law counts, including breach of contract and breach of
a fiduciary duty.36 It also alleged two violations of section 1962(c)
based on the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud as well as a viola
tion of the RICO conspiracy provision, section 1962(d). Based
upon these violations, Sedima sought treble damages and attorney's
fees under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).37
The district court dismissed Sedima's RICO claims for failing
to allege a "RICO-type injury."38 Such an injury, the district court
explained, arises in only two situations. In one situation, a "RICO
(citing REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE OF THE ABA SECTION OF
CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW 55 (1985».
29. Id. at 484-86.
30. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 496 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473
U.S. 479 (1985). By requiring a "racketeering injury," the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit had attempted to develop a doctrine to limit the scope of RICO.
"Given the general purpose of the RICO legislation, the uses to which private civil
RICO has been put have been extraordinary, if not outrageous." Id. at 487.
31. Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir.
1984), affd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985); Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., Inc., 742
F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 473 U.S. 922, adhered to in relevant
part, 770 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058 (1986); and Alcorn
County, Miss. V. United States Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1984).
32. Sedima, S.P.R.L. V. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 483 (1985).
33. Id. at 483-84.
34. Id. at 484.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Sedima, S.P.R.L. V. Imrex Co., 574 F. Supp. 963, 965 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), affd,
741 F.2d 482, 496 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985).

372

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:365

type injury" occurs "where 'a civil RICO defendant's ability to
harm the plaintiff is enhanced by the infusion of money from a pat
tern of racketeering acts into the enterprise."'39 In the other situa
tion, it occurs "where the plaintiff is forced to compete with an
enterprise that has gained an unfair market advantage through the
infusion of funds from racketeering activity."40
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dis
missal of Sedima's RICO claims.41 It stated that an alleged injury
must be "different in kind from that occurring as a result of the
predicate acts themselves, or not simply caused by the predicate
acts, but also caused by an activity which RICO was designed to
deter."42 Because the Clayton (antitrust) Act served as a model for
RICO, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held, a "racke
teering injury" would be analogous with the Clayton Act's require
ment of an "antitrust injury."43
2.

The Sup:reme Court's Reversal in Sedima 44

The Sedima Court held that section 1964(c) does not require a
39. Id. at 965 (quoting Landmark Sav. & Loan v. Rhoades, 527 F. Supp. 206, 209
(E.D. Mich. 1981)).
40. Id. (citing North Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207, 211
(M.D. Ill. 1980)).
These two theories on "RICO-type" injuries closely follow thewording of Senator
Hruska's original RICO bills. The Senator's first bill utilized antitrust laws to prohibit
"the use of intentionally and deliberately unreported income derived from one line of
business in another line of business." S. 2048, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); see 113
CONGo REc. 17999 (1967). The Senator's second bill "prohibit[ed] the investment in
legitimate business enterprises of income derived from specified criminal activities." S.
2049, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); see 113 CONGo REc. 17999 (1967).
41. Sedima, S.P.R.L. V. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S.
479 (1985)
42. Id. at 496. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also held that a civil
suit under section 1964(c) may proceed only if the defendant has been convicted of a
RICO violation. Id.
43. Id. at 495. The United States Supreme Court pronounced the "antitrust in
jury" requirement in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
The Brunswick Court held that "[p]laintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say
injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that
which makes defendants' acts unlawful." Id. at 489.
RICO, in fact, adopted several civil remedies developed in the antitrust field.
These included investigative demands, 18 U.S.c. § 1968 (1988), prohibitory injunctions,
18 U.S.c. § 1964(b) (1988), and the issuing of orders of divestment or dissolution, 18
U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1988).
44. Sedima, S.P.R.L. V. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985). The Sedima Court also
overruled the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's holding that a RICO civil
action may proceed only after a criminal conviction. Id. at 493. The Court held that the
term "violation" in § 1964(c) refers not to a conviction, but to acts which are
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"racketeering injury."4s Instead, the Court adopted the following,
literal interpretation of the statute: "A plaintiff only has standing if
... he has been injured in his business or property by the conduct
constituting the violation."46
The Court outlined, as an example, the conduct which consti
tutes a violation of section 1962(c). "A violation of [section]
1962(c) ... requires (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a
pattern (4) of racketeering activity."47 Therefore, Sedima stands for
the proposition that the compensable injury in a RICO civil action
based upon section 1962(c) "necessarily is the harm caused by pred
icate acts sufficiently related to constitute a pattern" when the acts
are committed "in connection with the conduct of an enterprise."48
The Court did not, however, outline the elements of a RICO
civil action based upon section 1962(d). In fact, Sedima's section
1962(d) claim was never addressed by the Court. Presumably, the
Court saw no need to address the conspiracy claim49 because if
Sedima had proven the commission of "a pattern of racketeering
activity," then a conspiratorial agreement would have been
inferable. 50
Though broadly interpreting RICO civil standing, the Sedima
Court did recognize the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's
underlying concern for the need to limit standing in the RICO con
"chargeable," "punishable," or "indictable" under section 1961(1). Id. at 488-89.
Furthermore, the Sedima Court found no support in the legislative history of RICO for
the Second Circuit's holding. Id. at 489-90. In fact, the Court held that such a
requirement of a conviction would impede Congress' underlying policy of stopping the
infiltration of organized crime into legitimate business because "[p]rivate attorney
general provisions such as § 1964(c) are in part designed to fill prosecutorial gaps." Id.
at 493.
45. [d. at 500.
46. [d. at 496. The Court relied upon RICO's Liberal Construction Provision
which provides that "[t]he provisions of this title ... shall be liberally construed."
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970)
(current version at 18 U.S.c. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. V 1993».
47. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 (footnote omitted).
48. Id. at 497. The Court viewed this interpretation as more consistent with
RICO's principles than the interpretation of the Second Circuit. Id. at 497-98. See
supra note 46; see also United States v. Thrkette, 452 U.S. 576,586-87 (1981).
49. In Schiffels v. Kemper Financial Services, 978 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1992), the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed this omission of the Sedima Court.
The Seventh Circuit concluded that "there was no need to address standing to raise a
§ 1962(d) claim, because if a plaintiff has standing to bring a § 1962(c) claim he neces
sarily has standing to bring a § 1962(d) claim." Id. at 349. Moreover, held the Seventh
Circuit, "the Court was going only so far as it needed to decide the case before it." Id.
50. Id.
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text.51 The Sedima Court, therefore, adopted the limitation utilized
by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The Seventh Cir
cuit had held that "'[a] defendant who violates section 1962 is not
liable for treble damages to everyone he might have injured by
other conduct, nor is the defendant liable to those who have not
been injured."'52
By adopting this holding, the Sedima Court fostered a new se
ries of appellate court decisions concerning the scope of proximate
causation in the RICO context. 53 RICO proximate causation was
not addressed again by the United States Supreme Court until its
1992 Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp. decision. 54
. 3.

The Sedima Dissent

Justice Marshall wrote the dissent in which Justices Brennan,
Blackmun, and Powell joined.55 Justice Marshall argued that by al
lowing standing for injuries caused by the predicate acts of section
1961, the majority was supplanting many state common law reme
51. The Sedima Court stated that "[w]e nonetheless recognize that, in its private
civil version, RICO is evolving into something quite different from the original concep
tion of its enactors . . .. Though sharing the doubts of the Court of Appeals about this
increasing divergence, we cannot agree with either its diagnosis or its remedy." Sedima,
473 U.S. at 500.
52. Id. at 496-97 (quoting Haroco, Inc. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747
F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984), affd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985».
53. Several circuits interpreted the Sedima language to grant standing only when
an injury directly flows from the predicate acts. Morast v. Lance, 807 F.2d 926 (11th
Cir. 1987); Marshall & Illsey mst Co. v. Pate, 819 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1987); Nodine v.
Textron, Inc., 819 F.2d 347 (1st Cir. 1987); Town of Kearney v. Hudson Meadows Urban
Renewal Corp., 829 F.2d 1263 (3d Cir. 1987).
Another group of circuits viewed the direct-injury requirement as overly restric
tive. They adopted a more traditional view of proximate causation requiring factual
and legal causation. Sperber v. Boesky, 849 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1988); Brandenburg v.
Speidel, 859 F.2d 1179 (4th Cir. 1988); Zervas v. Faulkner, 861 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1988).
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit distinguished itself as the only circuit
interpreting Sedima to require only factual causation. Bankers Trust Corp. v. Rhoades,
859 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007 (1989).
In Employers' RICO Liability for the Wrongful Discharge of Their Employees, 68
NEB. L. REV. 673 (1989), Laura Ginger argued that "the proper interpretation of the
Sedima decision with regard to civil RICO standing would seem to be that plaintiffs
injured either directly or indirectly by racketeering activity have standing to bring a pri
vate civil suit under the Act." Id. at 683.
54. 112 S. Ct. 1311 (1992). See infra notes 97-145 and accompanying text for the
facts and analysis of Holmes.
55. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted that
his dissent also applied to American National Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc., 473
U.S. 606 (1985). Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500. Justice Powell also wrote a separate dissent
to emphasize his disagreement. Id. at 523 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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dies56 as well as broad areas of federal law, including securities
law. 57 Justice Marshall claimed to find no support for such an ex
pansive reading of the statute.
In fact, Justice Marshall concluded, the distinct lack of atten
tion which Congress afforded to RICO's civil damages provision
demonstrates that Congress intended a much narrower interpreta
tion. 58 Justice Marshall, following the analogy to antitrust standing,
would have limited standing to "recovery for injury resulting from
the confluence of events described in [section] 1962 and not merely
from the commission of a predicate act. "59
C.

Wrongful Discharge and RICO Conspiracy Standing After
Sedima

The United States courts of appeals have unanimously denied
RICO standing to wrongfully discharged employees whose suits are
based upon RICO's substantive provisions, section 1962(a)-(c).60
Section 1962(a)-(c) requires, the courts hold, that the alleged injury
must result from "a pattern of racketeering activity."61 Because
56. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 501.
57. Id. at 504. See supra note 19 for Congress' list of racketeering activities, 18
U.S.c. § 1961(1) (Supp. V 1993).
58. Id. at 507, 518. The RICO bill passed by the United States Senate in 1970 did
not contain a civil damages provision. In hearings before the House Judiciary Commit
tee, however, it was suggested that the bill should include "the additional civil remedy
of authorizing private damage suits based on ... Section 4 of the Clayton Act." Organ
ized Crime Control Act, 1969: Hearings on S. 30 Before Subcomm. No.5 of the House
Comm. of the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 543-44 (1970) (statement of Edward
Wright, ABA president-elect); see also Sedima, 473 U.S. at 520 (statement of Represen
tative Steiger suggesting addition of a private civil damages remedy). The Committee
agreed, and without discussion, the provision was added. H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007.
Representatives Conyers, Mikva, and Ryan provided the only recorded objection
to the addition of § 1964(c) during hearings before the House Judiciary Committee.
H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4007,4083 (stating that the civil damages provision "provides invitation[s] for disgrun
tled and malicious competitors to harass innocent businessmen engaged in interstate
commerce").
59. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 509.
60. Bowman v. Western Auto Supply Co., 985 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1993); Kramer v.
Bachan Aerospace Corp., 912 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1990); Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912
F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 332 (1991); O'Malley v. O'Neill, 887
F.2d 1557 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 926 (1990); Shearin v. E.F. Hutton
Group, Inc., 885 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1989); Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d
527 (2d Cir. 1989); Cullom v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 859 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1988);
Nodine v. Textron, Inc., 819 F.2d 347 (1st Cir. 1987).
61. "The Supreme Court has held that in order for a litigant to establish standing
to bring a suit under § 1964(c) of RICO, the injury alleged must be a result of a viola
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wrongful discharge is not a "racketeering activity," wrongfully dis
charged employees must base their complaints upon section
1962(d). The results have ·been mixed.
1.

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Grants RICO
Standing Based on Section 1962(d)

In 1989, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held in
Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc. 62 that a wrongfully discharged
employee could have standing to sue under section 1964(c) if the
complaint was based on section 1962(d).63 The plaintiff, Shearin,
alleged that Hutton Trust was involved in a scheme of charging fees
to customers of Hutton, Inc. for trust services which were never
performed.64 In order to effectuate this scheme, Shearin claimed,
she was hired to give Hutton Trust the appearance of a genuine
trust company. When she threatened to disclose the alleged impro
prieties, however, she was abruptly dismissed. 65
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held in Shearin that
"[n]othing in Sedima forecloses the possibility" that predicate acts
for conspiracy standing may be traditional overt conspiracy acts
rather than section 1961(1) racketeering activity.66 The Sedima
Court, according to Shearin, had analyzed only violations of section
1962(a)-(c), and had focused its analysis on refuting the notion of a
"racketeering injury."67 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
agreed with Sedima that "racketeering activity" necessarily
amounts to predicate acts for the purpose of section 1962(a)-(c) be
cause the language of these subsections dictates that a violation oc
curs only when "a pattern of racketeering activity" has taken
place. 68
The Shearin court distinguished section 1962(d), however, be
cause it does not contain the words "racketeering activity." The
tion of § 1962." Bowman v. Western Auto Supply Co., 985 F.2d 383, 385 (8th Cir. 1993)
(citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985».
62. 885 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1989).
63. Id. at 1169-70. Four district courts had previously granted RICO standing to
wrongfully discharged employees. Williams v. Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Ky. 1988);
Komm v. McFliker, 662 F. Supp. 924 (W.D. Mo. 1987); Acampora v. Boise Cascade
Corp., 635 F. Supp. 66 (D.N.J. 1986); Callan v. State Chern. Mfg. Co., 584 F. Supp. 619
(E.D. Pa. 1984).
64. Shearin, 885 F.2d at 1164.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1169.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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court concluded that a plaintiff may have RICO standing based on
section 1962(d) if the alleged injury was caused by any act which
furthers an agreement (conspiracy) to engage in a pattern of racke
teering activity.69 Such an act, according to the Shearin court, could
be either racketeering activity or "classic overt conspiracy acts."70
The Shearin court added that" Sedima further indicates that classic
conspiracy acts not only may, but should, so qualify" as predicate
acts for subsection 1962(d).71
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit relied on Sedima's
interpretation of the language of section 1964(c) to conclude that
the civil damages provision also "did not mandate that racketeering
activity cause the harm."72 The Sedima Court had echoed the lan
guage of section 1964(c) when it held that, in order to have stand
ing, a person need only to have been "'injured in his business or
property by conduct constituting the [RICO] violation."'73 Thus,
the Shearin court found that neither section 1964(c) nor section
1962(d) required the commission of "racketeering activity."74
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that Shearin
had standing because her "hiring and firing plausibly constitute
overt acts that not only would establish a conspiracy, but in this
case were allegedly essential to it."75
2.

The Majority of the United States Courts of Appeals
Deny RICO Standing Based on Section 1962(d)76

Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc.7 7 has been cited as a
69. Id.
70.
71.
72.

[d.
[d.
[d.

73. [d. (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 (1985».
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1168. See Frederic Brooks, RICO Conspiracy Standing After Sedima, 25
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 423, 449 (agreeing with the Shearin court's holding because
"neither the RICO statute, congressional intent, nor Sedima suggest that such dis
charged employees may not bring a RICO conspiracy suit").
76. Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1991); Hecht v. Commerce
Clearing House, Inc., 897 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1990); Kramer v. Bachan Aerospace Corp.,
912 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1990); Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1990);
Cullom v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 859 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1988); Morast v. Lance, 807
F.2d 926 (11th Cir. 1987).
.
77. 897 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1990). Hecht alleged that he ·discovered his supervisors
"forging customer signatures ... , billing customers for fabricated or improperly con
firmed orders, and disregarding subscription cancellation requests." [d. at 22. When he
demanded an end to these practices, Hecht was allegedly told to participate or be fired.
When he refused to participate, he was terminated for insubordination. Id.
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leading case denying RICO standing to wrongfully discharged em
ployees. 78 The Hecht court did not agree with Shearin that "any
overt act in furtherance of [a RICO] conspiracy" can be the basis
for standing in a RICO civil action based on section 1962(d).79 The
Hecht court held that "Congress did not deploy RICO as an instru
ment against all unlawful acts. It targeted only predicate acts cata
logued under section 1961(1)."80 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit opined that RICO's "purpose ... is to target RICO
activities, and not other conduct. "81
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Reddy v. Litton
Industries, Inc.,82 addressed the resulting conflict between Hecht
and Shearin. The Reddy court noted that the facts of Shearin were
unique. In Shearin, the plaintiff's hiring and firing were essential to
the alleged conspiracy.83 The Reddy court held that Shearin should
be "construed narrowly," and that the Reddy facts were more simi
lar to those of Hecht. 84 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
then concluded that "[i]f ... there is any doctrinal inconsistency
between Hecht and Shearin, we prefer the rule of Hecht."8s
In Miranda v. Ponce Federal Bank, the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit joined the majority.86 The plaintiff, Miranda,
claimed she was discharged for refusing to participate in the de
fendants' conspiracy to obstruct a federal investigation. 87 The Mi
randa court took a federalist approach in denying standing. The
court held that "[RICO] cannot be used as a surrogate for local law,
as a panacea to redress every instance of man's inhumanity to man,
or as a terrible swift sword capable of righting all wrongs of a trou
bled world. "88
78. See Miranda, 948 F.2d at 48; Reddy, 912 F.2d at 295 (9th Cir. 1990).
79. Hecht, 897 F.2d at 25.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 912 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1990). The plaintiff, Reddy, alleged that he was termi
nated after reporting a bribery within Litton Industries to his superiors. Reddy then
refused to participate in Litton's cover-up of the illegal bribes. Id. at 293.
83. Id. at 295. See supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text for a full discussion
of Shearin.
84. Reddy, 912 F.2d at 295.
85. Id.
86. 948 F.2d 41, 48 (1st Cir. 1991).
87. Id. at 43.
88. Id. at 49. Nevertheless, the Miranda court still recognized Shearin's factual
distinction despite concluding that it preferred the denial of standing. Id. at 48 n.9.
Compare the Miranda court's holding with Justice Marshall's dissent in Sedima, dis
cussed in supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
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In Kramer v. Bachan Aerospace Corp.,89 the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit added another dimension to the majority's
analysis. The Sixth Circuit held that because "[t]he government,
not the plaintiff, was the target of defendant's scheme to ship defec
tive military hardware" that the plaintiff did not have standing. 90 In
Kramer, the plaintiff had allegedly been fired for blowing the whis
tle on his employer by reporting to the United States Defense De
partment that the defendant was manufacturing defective parts. 91
In Morast v. Lance,92 the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit added a policy argument to the majority's position. The
Morast court was faced with a claim by a bank manager allegedly
discharged for reporting his employer's banking violations and co
operating with an investigation of the bank. 93 The Morast court re
futed the argument that providing the bank manager with a RICO
remedy would deter RICO violations. 94 Instead, the Morast court
opined that providing a remedy in this situation would only benefit
the plaintiff: 95 Absent a deterrent effect, the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit held that Congress did not intend to provide a
RICO remedy.96
The majority of the United States Courts of Appeals, there
fore, provide the following five justifications for denying RICO
standing to a wrongfully discharged employee in a suit based upon
section 1962(d): (1) wrongful discharge is not a RICO predicate
act; (2) Shearin should be construed narrowly; (3) RICO does not
89. 912 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 199O).
90. Id. at 156 (emphasis added). The Kramer court held that plaintiffs injury
resulted from defendant's decision to fire him and not from a RICO conspiracy. [d.
91. Id. at 152.
92. 807 F.2d 926 (11th Cir. 1987).
93. Id. at 929.
94. Id. at 933.
. 95. Id.
96. Id. at 929. In Cullom v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 859 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1988),
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit interpreted this policy approach differently.
The Cullom court held that:
the policy reasons for allowing whistle blowers, as opposed to non-partici
pants, to sue under RICO are more persuasive because in addition to exposing
the illegal scheme to the public by bringing a private suit, the whistle blower
often times exposes the illegal scheme to the authorities and cooperates with
the authorities, thus 'strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering
process.'
[d. at 1217 (quoting the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1073
(statement of findings and purposes}). Nevertheless, the Cullom court denied standing
for either a whistle blower or an employee discharged for refusing to participate in an
illegal scheme because neither type of plaintiff has injuries which flow from RICO pred
icate acts. Id.
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displace local law; (4) wrongfully discharged employees are not the
targets of RICO conspiracies; and (5) providing a remedy would
not deter RICO violations.
II.

A.

PRINCIPAL CASES

Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.97
1.

Background to Holmes

Securities Investor Protection Corporation ("SIPC") was cre
ated as a private, nonprofit corporation. 98 Most broker-dealers reg
istered under section 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
were required to be members of SIPC. 99 The corporation was
charged with protecting the customers of broker-dealers by seeking
a protective decree in federal district court whenever it determined
that a member "'has failed or is in danger of failing to meet its
obligations to customers."'lOO
In July of 1981, SIPC sought decrees protecting the customers
of Joseph Sebag, Inc. and First State Securities Corporation
("FSSC").lOl The district courts entered the requested decrees and
appointed trustees to liquidate the broker-dealers.102 As a result of
the liquidations, SIPC had to advance nearly $13 million to cover
claims against FSSC and Sebag by their customers. 103
SIPC, and the trustees of FSSC and Sebag, subsequently
brought suit against seventy-five defendants in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California. 104 The plain
tiffs alleged that from 1964 through July 1981 the defendants had
"manipulated stock of six companies by making unduly optimistic
97.

112 S. Ct. 1311 (1992).

Id. at 1314 (1992) (noting that the Securities Investor Protection Act
("SIPA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1988), authorized the formation of SIPC).
99. Id. (noting that the manner of registration of brokers and dealers is codified
as 15 u.s.c. § 780(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) and the membership requirement is codi
fied as 15 U.S.c. § 78ccc(a)(2)(A) (1988».
100. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.c. § 78eee(a)(3) (1988».
101. Id.
102. Id. (noting that 15 U.S.c. § 78eee(b)(3) (1988) requires a trustee be ap
98.

pointed and charged with liquidating the member's business).
103. Id. at 1315 (Trustees are required to return all securities registered in specific
customers' names. 15 U.S.c. §§ 78fff-2(c)(2), 78fff(a)(1)(A), 78111(3) (1988). All securi
ties not so registered must be combined with cash found in customers' accounts and
divided ratably to satisfy customers' claims against the broker-dealer. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78fff-2(b), § 78 fff(a)(I)(B) (1988). SIPC must advance up to $500,000 per customer
to the extent that the broker-dealer's funds are inadequate to meet the claims. 15
U.S.C. § 78fff-3(a) (1988» .
. 104.

Id.
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statements about their prospects and by continually selling small
numbers of shares to create the appearance of a liquid market."105
In July 1981, the plaintiffs alleged, the market recognized defend
ants' fraudulent activities and the price of the manipulated stocks
plummeted. 106 Because FSSC and Sebag had bought substantial
amounts of the manipulated stock, the plaintiffs claim that this de
cline caused the broker-dealers' financial difficulties, resulted in the
broker-dealers' liquidation, and triggered SIPC's duty to advance
funds. 107
The complaint alleged that Holmes participated in this scheme
by making false statements about "one of the six companies, Aero
System, Inc., of which he was an officer, director, and major share
holder."108 The complaint also alleged that Holmes simulated a liq
uid market in one of the other six companies, Bunnington
Corporation, by selling small amounts of stoCk.109
The complaint charged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962, thereby
entitling SIPC and the trustees to treble damages under section
1964(c). It stated that the conspirators' violations of section lO(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,110 SEC Rule lOb-S,ll1 and
the mail and wire fraud statutes112 amounted to a "pattern of racke
teering activity. "113
After five years of litigation,114 the district court granted
Holmes summary judgment for two reasons. First,· the court held
that SIPC did not meet the standing requirements of section lO(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act nor of SEC Rule 10b-S. 115 Second,
neither SIPC nor the trustees were injured by reason of Holmes'
RICO violations. 116
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988)).
111. Id. (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1991)).
112. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
113. Id. at 1315 (1992) (citing 18 U.S.c. §§ 1962,1961(1) and (5) (1988 & Supp. V
1993)).
114. Id. at 1315 & n.4 (citing Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 803
F.2d 1513 (9th Cir. 1986) (Vigman II); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman,
764 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1985) (Vigman I)).
115. Id. at 1315. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
956 (1952). SIPC fails the Birnbaum test which requires a plaintiff to be a purchaser or
seller of a security.
116. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1315.
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The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 117 On
the first question, it held that a section 1964(c) RICO action has its
own independent standing requirements and does not incorporate
those of other statutes. llS On the second question, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court mistakenly
looked at the causal relationship of Holmes' action alone in relation
to the alleged injuries. It held that Holmes could be found respon
sible for the actions of his co-conspirators, and therefore, the causal
relation required reexamination. 119
Holmes' petition of certiorari presented two issues: 1) did
SIPC have a right to sue under RICO? and 2) could Holmes be
held responsible for the actions of his co-conspirators?120 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the first issue
alone. 121
2. The Holmes Opinion
In Holmes, the United States Supreme Court defined civil
RICO standing. In the late 1980s, lower courts had accepted proxi
mate causation as a standing requirement for section 1964(c), but
their efforts had demonstrated the concept's ambiguity.122 The
Holmes Court held that the "by reason of' language of section
1964(c) must require more than "but for" causation. l23 Factual cau
sation, according to the Court, could not have been Congress' sole
intention because" 'any attempt to impose responsibility on such a
basis would result in infinite liability for all wrongful acts."'124 The
Holmes Court, therefore, established the rule that a RICO plaintiff
has been injured "by reason of a [section] 1962 violation" only if
there exists "some direct relation between the injury asserted and
the injurious conduct alleged."l25
117. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 908 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir.
1990), affd, 112 S. Ct. 1311 (1991).
118. Id. at 1465-67.
119. Id. at 1467-69.
120. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1316. The Holmes Court assumed that the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit correctly held that Holmes could be held responsible for
the act of his co-conspirators. Id. n.6.
121. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 499 U.S. 974 (1991).
122. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1317 n.ll (citing 18 U.S.c. § 1964(c) (1988». See supra
note 53 and accompanying text for the various interpretations of RICO proximate cau
sation given by the United States courtS of appeals.
123. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1316.
124. Id. at 1316 n.10 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 264 (5th ed. 1984».
125. Id. at 1318. A recent Note suggested that "Holmes should not be misread to
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To arrive at this conclusion, the Holmes Court held that section
1964(c) of RICO was modeled after the "by reason of" language in
section four of the Clayton ACt. 126 The Clayton Act's civil damages
provision provides remedies for injuries caused by violations of an
titrust laws. 127 The United States Supreme Court had held in Asso
ciated General Contractors, Inc. v. Carpenters 128 that the antitrust
civil damages provision contained a direct-injury requirement. 129
The Holmes Court held, therefore, that because the Ninety-first
stand for (nor endorse) any type of bright-line test requiring a 'direct injury' for RICO
standing." Daniel J. Shapiro, Note, Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corpora
tion: Proximate Cause Dims the Bright- Lines of RICO Standing, 53 LA. L. REV. 1911,
1913 (1993).
126. The Supreme Court has observed the similarities between the two civil ac
tion provisions on three previous occasions. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1317. See Agency
Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 150-51 (1987) (holding that
the Clayton Act's four year statute of limitations for civil suits is applicable to RICO
civil suits); ShearsonlAmerican Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 241 (1987)
(holding that RICO claims, like antitrust claims, are subject to the Federal Arbitration
Act); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 489 (1985) (rejecting a "racketeering
injury" comparable to an "antitrust injury" requirement for civil suits).
127. The Clayton Act provides that "any person who shall be injured in his busi
ness or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor
in any district court of the United States ... and shall recover threefold the damages by
him sustained, and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 15 U.S.c.
§ 4 (1988). Compare 18 U.S.c. § 1964(c) (1988) with 15 U.S.c. § 4 (1988); see supra
note 4 for the text of 18 U.S.c. § 1964(c) (1988).
128. 459 U.S. 519, 529 (1983).
129. Section 4 of the Clayton Act was enacted in 1914. It borrowed language
from § 7 of the Sherman Act passed in 1890. The Supreme Court argues that prior to
1914 lower courts had read a direct-injury requirement into § 7, and that by adopting
the statute's language, Congress was adopting this "'judicial gloss that avoided a simple
literal interpretation.'" Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1317 (quoting Associated Gen. Contrac
tors, 459 U.S. at 533-34 & n.29).
In Standing Doctrine in Antitrust Damage Suits, 1890-1975: Statutory Exegesis, In
novation, and the Influence of Doctrinal History, John F. Hart contends that the conven
tional account of antitrust standing, including a direct-injury requirement and other
forms of restrictions, "is considerably incorrect." 59 TENN. L. REV. 191, 193-94 (1992)
[hereinafter Hart]. Professor Hart states that until the 1950s courts generally followed
the ordinary meaning of the antitrust broad statutory language. Id. In fact, Hart con
tinues, only Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1910), used the test prior
to the Clayton Act's enactment in 1914 although three other cases in that time period
are also cited as examples of the test. Hart, supra, at 194,209-14. See Ames v. AT&T
Co., 166 F. 820 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909); Corey v. Boston Ice Co., 207 F. 465 (D. Mass.
1913); Corey v. Independent Ice Co., 207 F. 459 (D. Mass. 1913). Hart, supra, at 208 nn.
107-08. Professor Hart's historical survey of antitrust standing finds that only a handful
of decisions between 1915 and 1950 invoked a direct-injury test. Id. at 218-24. Only in
the 1950s, suggests Hart, did the direct-injury test become generally accepted as a
means of applying policy to standing analysis. Id. at 232-33. And only in the 1970s,
points out Hart, was the direct-injury test accepted as the historical rule of antitrust
standing. Id. at 252-54.
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Congress used the same words in the RICO provision that were
found in the antitrust provision, "we can only assume it intended
them to have the same meaning that courts had already given
them."130
The Holmes Court then adopted from Associated General Con
tractors the following three reasons why a direct-injury requirement
was essential to the "by reason of" language:
First, the less direct an injury is, the more difficult it becomes to
ascertain the amount of a plaintiffs damages attributable to the
violation, as distinct from other, independent, factors. 131 Second,
quite apart from problems of proving factual causation, recogniz
ing claims of the indirectly injured would force courts to adopt
complicated rules apportioning damages among plaintiffs re
moved at different levels of injury from the violative acts, to ob
viate the risk of mUltiple recoveries.13 2 And, finally, the need to
grapple with these problems is simply unjustified by the general
interest in deterring injurious conduct, since directly injured vic
tims can generally be counted on to vindicate the law as private
attorneys general, without any of the problems attendant upon
suits by plaintiffs injured more remotely.133

Based on these reasons, the Court held that SIPC's injuries were
not proximately caused by the conspirators' conduct.t 34
Analyzing SIPC's claim under the first reason for a direct-in
jury requirement, the Court found that "the link is too remote be
tween the stock manipulation alleged and the customers' harm,
being purely contingent on the harm suffered by the broker-deal
ers. "135 It was the broker-dealers who were directly injured by the
conspirators' conduct and SIPC was subsequently injured only be
cause the broker-dealers failed to meet their obligations to their
customers.t 36 The Court labelled the broker-dealers' financial diffi
culties as an "intervening insolvency connect[ing] the conspirators'
130. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1318 (citing Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750,
756 (1979), and Northcross v. Memphis Board of Education, 412 U.S. 427,428 (1973),
to demonstrate the validity of applying the same meaning to statutory language bor
rowed in haec verba from other statutes).
131. Id. (citing Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,
542-43 (1983)).
132. Id. (citing Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 543-44; Blue Shield v.
McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 473-75 (1982); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 264
(1972)).
133. Id. (citing Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 541-42).
134. Id. at 1319.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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acts to the losses."137 Because SIPC's injury is less than direct, the
Court held that allowing SIPC's claim to proceed would require the
difficult determination of what portion of the injury was factually
caused by the conspiracy as opposed to other factors.138 As exam
ples, the Court suggested that portions of the injury could have
been caused by the broker-dealers' poor business practices or fail
ure to anticipate market changes. 139
Aside from this factual causation problem, the Court held that
the second reason for a· direct-injury requirement also demon
strated that SIPC should not recover under section 1964(c).140 If
indirectly-injured plaintiffs could recover under RICO, then district
courts would be faced with finding methods to apportion damages
in such a fashion as to prevent duplicative recoveries. 141 This prob
lem arose in Holmes because the broker-dealers remained liable to
SIPC via the nonpurchasing customers. If SIPC recovered indepen
dently, and then received indemnification from the broker-dealers,
then it would have received an unjustified windfal1. 142
Finally, the Holmes Court noted that the directly-injured par
ties also had a suit against the conspirators which could lead to re
imbursement for the indirectly-injured plaintiffs' alleged injuries. 143
The Court stated that a suit by indirectly-injured victims could be
an attempt to circumvent the priority which should be afforded to
directly-injured victims.l44
137. Id. Associated General Contractors involved an analogous factual situation.
The California State Council of Carpenters and the Carpenters 46 Northern Counties
Conference Board alleged that they were injured by the antitrust activities of Associ
ated General Contractors of California, Inc. The Carpenters claimed that Associated
coerced certain third parties to use only nonunion contractors and subcontractors,
thereby causing injury to the unions. The Court held, however, that any injuries suf
fered by the unions were only "an indirect result of whatever harm may have been
suffered by 'certain' construction contractors and subcontractors." Associated Gen.
Contractors, Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 541 (1983).
138. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1320.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. In Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972), the Court stated that
"[e]ven the most lengthy and expensive trial could not, in the final analysis, cope with
the problems of double recovery." Id. at 264.
142. The Holmes Court limited its evaluation of this reason for the direct-injury
requirement to the following sentence: "Assuming that an appropriate assessment of
factual causation could be made out, the district court would then have to find some
way to apportion the possible respective recoveries by the broker-dealers and the cus
tomers, who would otherwise each be entitled to recover the full treble damages."
Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1320.
143. Id. at 1320.
144. Id. at 1320-21.
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The Court concluded that it was not giving the statute an illib
eral construction. Rather, the Court held, the nonpurchasing cus
tomers "are not proper plaintiffs." By not allowing suits by
indirectly-injured victims the Court held that it was keeping the
doors closed to "'massive and complex damages litigation[, which
would] not only burde[n] the courts, but also undermin[e] the effec
tiveness of treble damages suitS."'145
B.

RICO Conspiracy Standing After Holmes
1.

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Joins the
Minority

In Schiffels v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc.,146 the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit became the first circuit to concur
with the Shearin court's analysis. 147 The Schiffels court held that
"since RICO conspiracy does not require the actual commission of
a predicate act, it follows that the act causing plaintiff's injury need
not be a predicate act of racketeering."148 Furthermore, the Schif
fels court opined, Congress could have limited section 1964's reme
dies to only those persons injured by predicate acts, but it did
145. Id. at 1321 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 545) (altera
tions in original). Observers have noted that "[t]here is a growing sentiment that ...
[RICO], which was 'created to help fight organized crime, is now being used primarily
by private individuals and corporations trying to extract large damage awards from le
gitimate businesses.'" Ginger, supra note 53, at 673 (quoting Diamond, Steep Rise Seen
in Private Use of Federal Racketeering Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1988, at AI).
Because the Court held that SIPC's injuries were not proximately caused by de
fendant's RICO violation, it declined the opportunity to rule on whether every plaintiff
using securities fraud as a RICO predicate act must be either a purchaser or seller.
Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 132l.
146. 978 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1992).
147. Id. at 348. "[T]he approach expounded in Shearin is the correct approach
because it is consistent with RICO's unambiguous language and with traditional con
cepts of conspiracy law." [d. See supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text for a full
discussion of Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 885 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1989).
148. Schiffels, 978 F.2d. at 348-49. The Schiffels court observed that § 1962(d)
targets "the agreement to violate RICO's substantive provisions, not the actual viola
tions themselves." [d. at 348 (citing United States v. Glecier, 923 F.2d 496, 500 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 54 (1991); Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 885 F.2d
1162, 1169 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Angi~lo. 847 F.2d 956. 964 (1st Cir.). cert.
denied. 488 U.S. 852 and cert. denied. 488 U.S. 928 (1988); United States v. Phillips. 664
F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1981). cert. denied. 457 U.S. 1136 and cert. denied. 459 U.S. 906
(1982».
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois had dismissed Schiffels'
complaint because she was not injured by any predicate act of racketeering. Schiffels v.
Kemper Fin. Servs .• Inc.• 767 F. Supp. 909 (N.D. Ill. 1991). rev 'd. 978 F.2d 345 (7th Cir.
1992).
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not. 149
The plaintiff, Schiffels, alleged that she was fired for attempting
to blow the whistle on a scheme by her supervisor to defraud two
mutual funds. She claimed that the scheme was conducted through
out most of 1987, and was followed by a conspiracy to cover up the
fraudulent activities. 150 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir
cuit, nevertheless, distinguished Schiffels from Shearin 151 by relying
on the Supreme Court's decision in Holmes that the injury must be
directly caused by the conduct constituting the violation. 152 SchiJ
Jels held that a plaintiff has standing to sue under RICO if the
"complaint alleges an injury to her business or property proxi
mately caused by an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy to vio
late RICO, even though the overt act is not a predicate act required
in a RICO pattern."153
Schiffels was not fired until February 15, 1990, after several in
vestigations had been conducted into her allegations. 154 The Sev
enth Circuit found, therefore, that by the time she was fired the
alleged fraudulent scheme had ended. "[A] fair reading of Schif
fels' complaint indicates only that she was fired in retaliation for
attempting to disclose the fraudulent scheme, not to further it or
prevent its disclosure. "155 Her injury may have been factually
caused by the conspiracy, but the injury was not proximately
caused. 156 Therefore, even though the Schiffels court explicitly
agreed with the analysis of Shearin, it reached a different result be
cause of the facts alleged.
2.

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Joins the
Majority

In Bowman v. Western Auto Supply CO.,157 the Court of Ap
peals for the Eighth Circuit joined the majority of circuits denying
149. Schiffels, 978 F.2d at 350. Compare Miranda v. Ponce Federal Bank, 948
F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1991), in which the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated that
allowing a § 1964(c) remedy for a traditional overt conspiracy act would be "tanta
mount to rewriting the statute." Id. at 48; see supra note 86-88 and accompanying text.
150. Schiffels, 978 F.2d at 346-47.
151. The Seventh Circuit noted, in dictum, that Shearin had been directly-injured
by the conspiracy to violate RICO. Id. at 351.
152. Only "[a] person directly injured by an overt act in furtherance of a RICO
conspiracy has been injured 'by reason or the conspiracy." Id. at 349 (emphasis added).
153. Id. at 351.
154. Id. at 347.
155. Id. at 353.
156. Id. at 351.
157. 985 F.2d 383 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2459 (1993).
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RICO standing to wrongfully discharged employees. Bowman al
leged that he had discovered Western Auto Supply Company charg
ing its merchandise suppliers for advertising and promotional
services that were never performed. 15S Bowman contended that he
was subsequently discharged because he spoke out against and criti
cized the fraudulent scheme. 159
The Bowman court held that RICO conspiracy suits require
the same predicate acts as RICO substantive provisions. 16o It con
cluded that an injury cannot be caused "by a mere agreement to
violate RICO .... Some overt act must occur in order to establish
civil standing based on [section] 1962(d)."16I "Because Congress
targeted specific types of activity in the RICO statute, rather than
'all unlawful acts,' ... the limiting factor must be that only harm
from a [section] 1961(1) predicate act done in furtherance of a
RICO conspiracy will suffice to establish standing."162
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that the Holmes decision pro
vided an example of how opportunities should be taken "to care
fully delineate the types of plaintiffs who may validly bring a
suit"163 under RICO. By holding that injuries under section
1962(d) must flow from racketeering activity, the Eighth Circuit
reasoned that it was effectuating the statute's purpose,164 The
Eighth Circuit rejected the Seventh Circuit's approach in Schiffels
that the direct-injury test alone prevents civil RICO liability from
being unlimited. 165
Finally, the Eighth Circuit recognized the critique that its ap
proach may collapse suits based on section 1962 violations into suits
based on RICO's substantive provisions. 166 The Eighth Circuit re
sponded that "any other result would render this decision merely a
guide to the artful pleader."167 The Eighth Circuit, therefore,
sought to prevent civil litigants from using the threat of treble dam
ages as bargaining leverage by alleging a conspiracy to violate
158.
159.
160.

1991».
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 386 (citing Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F.2d 41, 48 (1st Cir.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 388.
Id.
Id. at 387.
Id. at 388.
Id.
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RICO's substantive provisions. 168

III.

ANALYSIS

This Note seeks to identify Congress' intention to provide a
civil remedy for injuries caused "by reason of" a conspiracy to vio
late RIC0.1 69 It addresses this issue in the context of civil RICO
actions brought by wrongfully discharged employees. Because the
United States Supreme Court has not addressed this issue, this sec
tion predicts what the Court would hold by analyzing RICO's un
derlying policies and the means by which the Court has effectuated
those policies in other contexts. The United States Supreme Court
has handed down two decisions which are now the focus of litiga
tion among the United States courts of appeals with respect to
RICO civil actions based on section 1962(d). In the first decision,
the Sedima Court outlined the elements of a section 1962(c) RICO
violation. 170 The United States courts of appeals disagree as to
whether the Sedima analysis also applies to a suit based upon a sec
tion 1962(d) violation. l7l
In the second decision, the Holmes Court ruled that RICO civil
remedies are limited to plaintiffs who are directly-injured by RICO
violations. l72 Unlike the Sedima holding, the Holmes direct-injury
test explicitly applies to RICO civil suits based on any violation of
section 1962, including a RICO conspiracy. This Note, therefore,
utilizes the Holmes decision as its nucleus for analyzing the RICO
standing of wrongfully discharged employees. It suggests that the
disagreement among the United States courts of appeals with re
spect to the Sedima analysis can be reconciled by applying the
Holmes test.
The direct-injury test consists of three factors: (1) the remote
ness of the plaintiff's injury; (2) the danger of duplicate recoveries
by mUltiple plaintiffs; and (3) the deterrent effect of allowing indi
vidual plaintiffs to recover. 173 By applying the direct-injury test to
actions brought by wrongfully discharged employees, this Note will
168.

[d.

169. Congress set forth this intent with the following statement: "[s]ubsection (d)
makes conspiracy to violate (a), (b) or (c) equally subject to the remedies of section[]
... 1964." S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 159 (1969).
170. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985); see supra text ac
companying note 47.
171. See supra parts I.B and I1.B.
172. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1311,1318 (1992);
see supra note 125 and accompanying text.
173. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1318; see supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
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conclude that the minority position among the United States courts
of appeals should prevail. The complaints of wrongfully discharged
employees should be able to survive a motion to dismiss. They
should be considered "proper [RICO] plaintiffs."174
A.

Are Wrongfully Discharged Employees' Damages Too Remote
from a RICO Violation?

The Holmes Court held that Congress did not intend to pro
vide damages for all injuries which would not have occurred "but
for" a defendant's RICO violation. 175 As a matter of statutory con
struction, the Court adopted this stance by analogy to antitrust
law. 176 The policy reason behind the holding, however, is more im
portant. If the Court had adopted a theory of "but for" causation,
then the courts would be filled with "'massive and complex dam
ages litigation[, which would] not only burde[n] the courts, but also
undermin[e] the effectiveness of treble-damages suits.'''177
The Holmes Court held that "the less direct an injury is, the
more difficult it becomes to ascertain the amount of a plaintiff's
damages attributable to the violation, as distinct from other, in
dependent factors."178 In theory, this concern is especially salient
when considering a civil action based on a RICO conspiracy. As
the facts in United States v. Elliott179 demonstrate, the enterprise
174. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1321. The direct-injury test is designed to distinguish
those plaintiffs whose complaints will further Congress' goals from those whose com
plaints will not.
Prior to the Holmes decision, Laura Ginger concluded that "wrongful discharge is
by definition an injury which results only indirectly from a RICO violation." Ginger,
supra note 53, at 700. This conclusion rested on the premise that if an injury does not
result from a predicate act then it must be indirect. Id. at 680. The Holmes test demon
strates, however, that the direct-injury requirement is a separate and distinct test from
the requirement of a predicate act. This Note has further argued that the predicate act
requirement does not exist when a § 1964(c) claim is based on a RICO conspiracy be
cause § 1962(d) does not require the actual commission of "a pattern of racketeering
activity." See supra part I.A. Wrongful discharge, therefore, is not by definition an
indirect injury simply because it is not a "racketeering activity." See also Brooks, supra
note 75, at 446 (arguing that "since RICO conspiracy is a distinct offense, it is mislead
ing to characterize the firing as an injury indirect to all RICO violations").
175. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1316. The Court noted, nevertheless, that the "by rea
son of' language in § 1964(c) could be interpreted to require only "but for" causation.
Id.
176. Id. at 1317-18; see supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
177. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1321 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v.
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 545 (1983» (alterations in original).
178. Id. at 1318 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 542-43); see supra
note 131 and accompanying text.
179. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 953 (1978).
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theory of RICO conspiracy allows for the single prosecution of a
large number of individuals involved in highly diversified crimes. 18o
The "enterprise" theory, therefore, provides many events to which
RICO civil liability could be attached by private litigants as well as
many possible intervening causes.
The Holmes Court's refusal to adopt factual causation in RICO
civil actions, however, does not eliminate the efficacy of suits
brought by wrongfully discharged employees. The Schiffels court
applied the direct-injury test to an employee who blew the whistle
on a fraudulent scheme by her supervisor; but the court denied lia
bility to the plaintiff because she was not discharged until after the
scheme had ended. 181 The Schiffels court concluded that the link
between the conspiracy and the discharge was too tenuous under
the facts alleged.
The Schiffels court concurred in dictum, however, with the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit's decision to grant standing
in Shearin. In Shearin, the plaintiff alleged that her hiring and firing
had been "essential" to the defendants' RICO conspiracy. The
damages suffered by the plaintiff in Shearin were attributable to the
RICO conspiracy of the plaintiff's employers. The plaintiff's claim
in Shearin, therefore, survived a motion to dismiss. 182
The Bowman court argued that the analysis presented by the
Shearin and Schiffels courts "would render [RICO conspiracy suits]
merely a guide to the artful pleader."183 In a sense, this criticism is
justified. Plaintiffs will sometimes be able to characterize their
grievances in manners which allow their claims to survive a motion
to dismiss. The Reddy court had been close to recognizing such a
distinction when it held that Shearin should be narrowly construed
and joined the majority position because of the specific facts alleged
by the plaintiff. l84
The Bowman court fails to realize in its analysis that proximate
cause is first an issue for the court. "The administration of rules of
180. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text for the facts of Elliott.
181. For the full discussion of Schiffels v. Kemper Financial Services, 978 F.2d 344
(7th Cir. 1992), see supra notes 146-56 and accompanying text.
182. For the full discussion of Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 885 F.2d 1162
(3d Cir. 1989), see supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text.
183. Bowman v. Western Auto Supply Co., 985 F.2d 383, 388 (8th Cir.), cen. de
nied, 113 S. Ct. 2459 (1993).
184. Reddy v. Litton Indus., 912 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1990). See supra notes 82-85
and accompanying text. The facts in Reddy made it easy for the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit to side with the majority because the facts involved an employee who
refused to participate in the employer's alleged racketeering activities.
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law, and the determination of facts upon which there could be no
reasonable differences of opinion is in the hands of the court. "185
Furthermore, the artful pleaders feared by the Bowman court will
also be subject to motions for summary judgment. If the Bowman
court had properly applied the Holmes direct-injury test it would
have understood that it was unnecessary to continue denying RICO
standing to wrongfully discharged plaintiffs simply because their in
juries were not caused by a RICO predicate act. Many of the same
cases would be disposed of because the employees' injuries would
be too remote from the RICO conspiracy.
B.

Is There a Danger of Duplicate Recoveries in RICO Civil
Actions Brought by Wrongfully Discharged Employees?

The Holmes Court's second justification for the direct-injury
test was the difficulty in "apportioning damages among plaintiffs
removed at different levels of injury from the violative acts."186
The Holmes Court held that "district court[s] would ... have to find
some way to apportion the possible respective recoveries."187 The
fear was that duplicate recoveries would result by allowing both di
rectly and indirectly-injured plaintiffs to recover from the same de
fendant, which would be followed by the indirectly-injured plaintiff
also recovering from the directly-injured plaintiff.
In Holmes, the Court denied recovery to an insurance com
pany attempting to recover against an alleged RICO violator. The
Court held that the broker-dealers who were insured by the com
pany were directly-injuH~d by the defendant. If the broker-dealers
recovered from the defendant then they would be subject to repay
ing the insurance funds which they had been advanced. If the insur
ance company recovered from the defendant, then it might receive
a windfall. Not only could the insurance company receive damages
from the defendant, but it could also receive reimbursement from
the insured broker-dealers.
In a wrongful discharge case, however, there is no risk of dupli
cate recovery. The basis of the employee's damages are unrelated
to the basis of damages to plaintiffs injured by predicate acts. Be
cause the wrongfully discharged employee has no claim against the
185.

w.

PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 45, at 319-20 (5th ed. 1984).

186. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1318 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v.
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 543-44 (1983».
187. Id. at 1320.
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party injured by RICO predicate acts, it would be improper to char
acterize the employee as indirectly-injured.
An analogous situation arose in the antitrust context of Blue
Shield v. McCready.188 In that case, the defendant, Blue Shield, vi
olated antitrust laws by providing reimbursement to subscribers
treated by psychiatrists, but not to those subscribers treated by psy
chologists. Blue Shield's policy was aimed at discouraging the use
of psychologists. 189 The Court held that because Blue Shield would
not reimburse the plaintiff, McCready, for payments she had made
to a psychologist that she was directly-injured "by reason of" the
antitrust violation.190 The plaintiff had no claim against the psy
chologists because the psychologists had only received from her the
money they deserved for their services. The plaintiff's claim was
against Blue Shield for failing to reimburse her as a part of the anti
trust violation, and therefore, she was directly-injured by Blue
Shield.
The danger of double liability is nonexistent in wrongful dis
charge RICO conspiracy cases. The Kramer court held, however,
that wrongfully discharged employees could not recover under
RICO because they are not the targets of RICO violations. 191 Tar
get-analysis appears to be justified in situations such as Holmes
which involve the prospect of duplicative recovery, but target-anal
ysis is not a good methodology for analyzing RICO standing be
cause it does not distinguish between duplicate and non-duplicate
recovery situations. Because there is no danger of wrongfully dis
charged employees receiving duplicate recovery, their injuries
should be considered directly caused by a RICO conspiracy.
C.

Would the Granting of RICO Standing to Wrongfully
Discharged Employees Serve RICO's Deterrent
Function?

Finally, the Holmes Court held that "directly injured victims
can generally be counted on to vindicate the law as private attor
neys general."192 Under the majority position, directly-injured vic
tims would include only those plaintiffs injured by a RICO
predicate act. This dependence on RICO predicate acts derives
188. 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
189. Id. at 467-70.
190. Id. at 484.
191. Kramer v. Bachan Aerospace Corp.• 912 F.2d 151. 156 (6th Cir. 1990); see
supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
192. Holmes. 112 S. Ct. at 1318.

394

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:365

from the Sedima Court's holding and the impression that the courts
must "carefully delineate the types of plaintiffs who may validly
bring a suit under RICO's civil enforcement provisions."193
The majority of the United States courts of appeals, however,
place an unwarranted importance on the list of RICO predicate
acts. A study of RICO's legislative history demonstrates that the
predicate acts merely served as a means to reach the desired end of
stopping the infiltration of legitimate businesses by organized
crime. As RICO evolved from Senator Hruska's original bill into
its present form the list of predicate acts increased from four non
descript activities to a diverse list of state and federal laws. 194 The
explanation for this expansion of activities is that Congress in
tended the list to reflect the activities of organized crime. In other
words, organized crime is as organized crime does. 195
The Miranda court argued for the majority of the United
States courts of appeals, however, that "[RICO] cannot be used as a
surrogate for locallaw."196 This federalism approach sounds of Jus
tice Marshall's dissent in Sedima.l 97 Justice Marshall also wanted to
limit the scope of RICO, but the majority of the Sedima Court dis
agreed with the "racketeering injury" approach with which he
sought to achieve his goal. Instead, the Sedima Court held that
remedies should be provided for injuries caused by conduct consti
tuting a violation of section 1962.198 Not until the Holmes decision
did the Court apply the standing limitation that a plaintiff's suit
must serve to deter RICO violations in order to be classified as a
direct-injury.
A conspiracy to violate RICO was recognized as a separate
RICO offense because Congress understood that "certain offenses
193. Bowman v. Western Auto Supply Co., 985 F.2d 383, 388 (8th Cir.), cert. de
nied, 113 S. Ct. 2459 (1993).
194. S. 2049, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) included gambling, bribery, narcotics,
and extortion as the activities which it sought to address. See 113 CONGo REC. 17999
(1967); see supra note 19 for Congress' list of racketeering activity, 18 U.S.c. § 1961(1)
(Supp. V 1993). Note that this list continues to be expanded and amended. In 1992, the
United States Congress added several new offenses to the list of predicate acts.
195. S. REp. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969). Congress defined "'racke
teering activity' to include those crimes most often associated with organized crime,
especially those associated with the infiltration of legitimate organizations." Id.
196. Miranda V. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F.2d 41, 49 (1st Cir. 1991); see supra notes
86-88 and accompanying text.
197. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479. 500 (1985) (Marshall. J., dis
senting); see supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
198. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496; see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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produce a continuing result."l99 A RICO conspiracy is more than a
mere adoption of state law. The agreement must be in furtherance
of a RICO "enterprise."200 18 U.S.c. § 1962(d) does not require
the commission of "a pattern of racketeering activity." Thus, the
predicate acts were not intended to serve as an independent limit
ing factor for RICO standing based upon. a RICO conspiracy
violation.
The United States Supreme Court has not addressed the issue
of whether allowing wrongfully discharged employees to bring
RICO suits would deter RICO violations.201 It would seem, how
ever, that employees could well serve this function. The employees
of an "enterprise" are in a unique position to observe the activities
of said enterprise. Their awareness of the activities of the enter
prise in which they are employed is demonstrated by the facts of the
several cases discussed in this Note.
CONCLUSION

The United States courts of appeals need to change their focus
from the Sedima approach to the Holmes direct-injury test in order
to evaluate RICO standing for wrongfully discharged employees.
In one stroke, the direct-injury test will limit RICO standing while
providing redress to "proper plaintiffs;" the direct-injury test will
allow recovery only to employees whose discharges were suffi
ciently linked to a RICO conspiracy.
The proper elements of a RICO civil action based upon a vio
lation of 18 U.S.c. § 1962(d) should be the following: (1) an agree
ment manifested by any overt act; (2) to violate any subsection of
section 1962(a)-(c); (3) in furtherance of the affairs of an enterprise;
(4) which directly causes; (5) an injury to business or property. This
interpretation does the most justice to the RICO statute.
Keith S. Marks

199. S. REp. No. 617 at 160.
200. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
201. "Private attorney general provisions such as § 1964(c) are in part designed to
fill prosecutorial gaps." Sedima, 473 U.S. at 493.

